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RECENT CASES
Private Nuisance-Urban
Redevelopment-Owner of Abandoned Building
in Improved Neighborhood Must Compensate
Neighbor for Diminution in Value of Neighbor's
Land
I.

INTRODUCTION

Outside the realm of eminent domain and zoning, the law of
private nuisance provides judicial response to problems of conflicting land uses. As the private landowner's legal weapon for eliminating a use incompatible in the neighborhood, private nuisance law
affords an effective remedy because the unreasonable, nonconforming use can be enjoined or its perpetrator subjected to liability for
damages. Nevertheless, indiscriminate application of existing doctrine might jeopardize fair and efficient resolution of problems of
land use control. Considered in the light of equity and economics, a
recent New York decision reveals the need to scrutinize more closely
private nuisance actions and the remedies flowing therefrom.
II. THE INSTANT DECISION
In Puritan Holding Co. v. Holloschitz,1 plaintiff, owner of a
recently renovated apartment building in New York City, sought
damages in a private nuisance action against a neighboring landowner whose abandoned, deteriorating premises had become infested with derelicts. 2 Plaintiff claimed that the abandonment
3
caused a decline in the market value of his renovated building,
thwarting urban redevelopment efforts in the neighborhood. 4 Since
defendant failed to appear, the New York Supreme Court accepted
the uncontroverted proof and held for plaintiff.6 Characterizing the
1. 82 Misc. 2d 905, 372 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Sup. Ct. 1975).

2. The buildings owned by plaintiff and defendant are almost directly across from each
other on West 93d Street in Manhattan. Id. at ._,
372 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
3.

Plaintiff offered proof of a $30,000 to $35,000 diminution in the value of his property

since defendant's abandonment. Moreover, plaintiff alleged that the condition of defendant's
property precluded plaintiff from obtaining a mortgage. Id.

4. The parcels in question are located in Manhattan's West Side Urban Renewal Area.
Id. at -,
372 N.Y.S.2d at 502.
5. The Supreme Court in New York is the equivalent of a county trial court.
6. Although the court found defendant in violation of a city ordinance requiring vacant
buildings to be either guarded or sealed, its holding was not predicated on the violation of
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case as one of first impression, the court applied general principles
of private nuisance law7 educed from prior New York decisions.'
Because those decisions found location of the purported nuisance
crucial, the court considered the neighborhood surrounding the parties and concluded that even though an idle, degenerate building
might be permissible in a slum, the same building was objectionable
in a rejuvenated area.' As a point of policy, the court opined that
one deviant building should not be allowed to ruin an entire upgraded neighborhood.10 The court determined, therefore, that the
concept of private nuisance should subsume a vacant, deteriorating
building in a revitalized urban locale." Consequently, plaintiff was
awarded compensatory damages equivalent to the diminution in the
2
market value of his property.'
III.

THE LAW OF PRIVATE NUISANCE

Rooted in English common law,'3 the concept of private nuisance" has grown into the tort principles that restrict a landowner
the ordinance. Id. at -, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 502; see NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. C, §
C26-80.0 (1970).
7. The court, quoting from Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 902, 908 (1965), relied on a definition of
nuisance that subjects to liability one whose "'unreasonable, unwarrantable, or unlawful
use'" of his property materially interferes with the rights of another. 82 Misc. 2d at -,
372 N.Y.S.2d at 501. Although plaintiff alleged a private nuisance, the court did not distinguish between public and private nuisances in its reasoning. See note 14 infra.
8. 82 Misc. 2d at _,
372 N.Y.S.2d at 501-02. Cases cited by the court involving
adjacent or proximate landowners include Dixon v. New York Trap Rock Corp., 293 N.Y. 509,
58 N.E.2d 517 (1944) (blasting); Mandell v. Pasquaretto, 76 Misc. 2d 405, 350 N.Y.S.2d 561
(Sup. Ct. 1973) (odors from a tire shop); Shearing v. City of Rochester, 51 Misc. 2d 436, 273
N.Y.S.2d 464 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (open burning in a city landfill).
9. 82 Misc. 2d at _
372 N.Y.S.2d at 502.
10. For an appreciation of the court's fear that one abandoned building would ruin an
entire neighborhood see Nachbaur, Empty Houses: Abandoned Residential Buildings in the
Inner City, 17 How. L.J. 3, 10-14, 15-25 (1971); NEWSWEEK, Jan. 12, 1970, at 36; TIME, Mar.
16, 1970, at 88; U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 26, 1970, at 55.
11. Because of the high number of annual abandonments in New York City and because
of the City's financial incapability to police delinquent landowners, the court predicted that
a flood of litigation might spring from its opinion. The court referred to the City's Housing
and Development Administration estimate of 12,000 units per year abandoned. 82 Misc. 2d
at -, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 502. Statistics on abandonment of buildings in other metropolitan
areas may be found in Edson, Housing Abandonment-The Problem and a Proposed
Solution, 7 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 382 (1972); Nachbaur, supra note 10; TIME, Mar. 16,
1970, at 88.
12. The plaintiff was awarded $30,000 as compensatory damages. 82 Misc. 2d at
,
372 N.Y.S.2d at 502.

13.

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF

TORTS § 821D, comment a at 41-42 (Tent. Draft No. 16,

1970); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §§ 86-87 (1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; Comment,
Nuisance as a Modern Mode of Land Use Control, 46 WASH. L. REv. 47, 54-56 (1970).
14. Public nuisance, distinguishable from private nuisance, concerns an interference
with rights common to at least a large class of people. Whereas plaintiff's interest in land is
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from using his property to his neighbor's detriment. 5 Those principles dictate that a landowner's right to use his property is not absolute; rather, it is qualified by competing claims of neighbors to be
free from disturbances in the enjoyment of their land."6 Since interference with rights to use and enjoy land is the essence of a private
nuisance, emphasis is primarily upon invasion of interests instead
of tortious conduct.' 7 Even so, the reasonableness and utility of the
defendant's activity is significant in determining liability and reme8
dies.'
Defined as an interference with an individual's rights in land,'9
private nuisance focuses on the plaintiff landowner and the harm
suffered by him. Although the plaintiff need not own or possess
land, he must have some interest in the land affected by the purported nuisance to maintain a cause of action. 0 The plaintiff ordinarily is established in the community before he complains of a
neighboring use. Nevertheless, according to the prevailing view, a
newcomer also may obtain relief, even though he knows of a preexisting and potentially harmful use. 2' Based on the theory that tribasic to a private nuisance, in a public nuisance action plaintiff's land ownership is inapposite. The distinction between public and private nuisances rests not on the defendant's
activity but on the nature of the interest invaded. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821B,
821C (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970); PROSER §§ 86, 88 at 573, 582. One activity may constitute
both a public and a private nuisance; a public nuisance becomes also a private nuisance to
any landowner injured by the defendant's use beyond the injury felt by the public at large.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Introductory Note to Chapter 40 at 216-18 (1939).
15. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §§ 821D-26 (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 822-31 (1939); PROSSER § 89.
16. PROSSER § 89; Smith, Reasonable Use of One's Own Property as a Justificationfor
Damage to a Neighbor, 17 COLUM. L. REv. 383, 383-84 (1917); see Booth v. Rome, W. &
O.T.R.R., 140 N.Y. 267, 274-75, 35 N.E. 592, 594 (1893); Cross, The DiminishingFee, 20 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 517 (1955); Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U.
PA. L. REv. 691 (1938).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970); RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS, Introductory Note to Chapter 40 at 218-22 (1939); PROSSER § 87 at 573-74; see text
accompanying notes 19-25 infra.
18. See text accompanying notes 26-36 infra.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970); RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 822 (1939); PROSSER § 89 at 591.
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821E (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970); RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 823 (1939); PROSSER § 89 at 593-94.
21. Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972);
Mahone v. Autry, 55 N.M. 111, 227 P.2d 623 (1951); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840D
(Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970); 1973 UTAH L. REv. 55, 57; 26 VAD. L. REv. 193, 196 (1973). Contra,
Dill v. Excel Packing Co., 183 Kan. 513, 331 P.2d 539 (1958). A plaintiff's coming to the
nuisance ordinarily is regarded as one of the circumstances to consider in determining
whether the defendant is reasonably using his land. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840D
(Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970); 26 VAND. L. REV. 193, 196 (1973); see text accompanying notes
27-33 infra.
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fling inconveniences are necessary evils, the law requires that the
2
plaintiff incur a substantial invasion of rights before recovering.
The invasion, however, may be nontrespassory; mere depreciation
in the value of land because of a neighboring use generally entitles
the plaintiff to his day in court.2 3 Similarly, invasions offending a
landowner's sense of smell or aesthetics, arousing fear of harm, or
otherwise disturbing peace of mind have been held actionable.24 In
any event, the invasion must offend a person of normal sensibilities
or interfere with a normal use of land; hypersensitivity in persons
or property is not protected. 5
Although the plaintiffs predicament underlies a private nuis-

ance action, consideration also must be granted to the nature of the
defendant's conduct and the social value of his activity.28 Broadly
stated, reasonable use of land by the defendant insulates him from
liability.27 A determination of reasonableness, a question for the
trier of fact,2 comprehends weighing the utility of the defendant's

conduct against the severity of the plaintiffs injury.29 Utility depends largely on the extent to which the defendant's activities contribute favorably to society, 3 and on the character of the neighborhood encompassing the land of plaintiff and defendant.' Considerations governing the severity of the plaintiffs injury include the ex-

tent and character of harm, the social value of the plaintiff's use,
and the suitability of the use to the neighborhood. 2 If the balancing
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F, comment c at 55 (Tent. Draft No. 16,
1970); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822, comments g &j at 229-30, 231-32 (1939); PROSSER § 87
at 577-80; Comment, supra note 13, at 66-68.
23. PROSSER § 89 at 591-93. But see Comment, supra note 13, at 60 & n.37.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D, examples at 45-46 (Tent. Draft No. 16,
1970); PROSSER § 89 at 591-93; Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules,
and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681, 733-35 (1973); Note, Aesthetic
Nuisance: An Emerging Cause of Action, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1075 (1970); Comment, supra note
13, at 60-66; 12 ALBERTA L. REV. 542 (1974).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F, comment d (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970);
PROSSER § 87 at 578-79. Normalcy depends upon the prevailing standards in the community.
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971); RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS §§ 822(d), 824-25 (1939); PROsSER §§ 87, 89 at 580-82, 596-602.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971); RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 822(d) (1939); PROSSER § 89 at 596-602; Smith, supra note 16; Comment, supra note
13, at 68-75; 50 Ky. L.J. 104 (1961).
28. Smith, supra note 16, at 384.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971); RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 826 (1939); PROSSER § 87 at 580-81.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828(a) (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971); RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 828(a) (1939); PROSSER § 89 at 597-99.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828(b) (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971); RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS §§ 828(b), 831(b)-(c) (1939); PROSSER § 89 at 599-601.
32. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 827 (1939).
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process prefers the plaintiff, the defendant will be subject to liability because his use is unreasonable." Another prerequisite of liability is that the defendant's activity be the legal cause of the plaintiff's injury." This does not mean, however, that passive land ownership exculpates the defendant. An inactive landowner may be liable
for a private nuisance if his inactivity, unreasonable under the circumstances, injures a neighbor." For liability to attach in this kind
of situation, the law requires that the defendant possess either actual or imputed knowledge of the result of his passivity."
Assuming that the plaintiff proves a private nuisance, the court
still must impose an appropriate remedy.37 In this regard the plaintiff's prerogative significantly limits the court's discretion. The successful plaintiff might seek and obtain damages for personal or intangible interests that have been disturbed or for depreciation in the
value of his land." When damages are an inadequate remedy, the
plaintiff might turn to equity for an injunction. A prayer to enjoin
the defendant necessitates a balancing of interests between the incompatible landowners, and if compliance with an injunction unduly will oppress the defendant, the court might deny relief. If the
plaintiff's predicament warrants an equitable remedy, however, the
court can mold a decree to comport with the particular situation.39
33. REATEMENT OF ToiRrs § 826 (1939). A split of authority exists concerning which
party has the burden of proof on the issue of reasonable use. See PROSSER § 87 at 581 n.6.
What is unreasonable under one set of facts might be reasonable under another. McCarty v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y. 40, 46, 81 N.E. 549, 550 (1907); Smith, supra note 16, at
385.
One commentator advocates that a standard of "unneighborliness" replace the unreasonableness standard. His general rule for determining liability is that a landowner is liable for
a change in land use only if the change is perceived as unneighborly according to contemporary community preferences. This rule, he says, is more democractic and dynamic than
existing law and would foster equity and efficiency in controlling conflicting land uses. Ellickson, supra note 24, at 731-32.
34. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822(c) & comment h at 230 (1939).
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)op ToRTS §§ 838-39 (Tent. Draft No. 16,1970); RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS §§ 824(b), 838-39 (1939). If a landowner fails to maintain in a normal way an
improvement on his property, "he is liable for failure to abate the harmful conditions created." Ellickson, supra note 24, at 727-28; see caveat to § 838 of RESTATE ENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970).
36. See authorities cited note 35 supra. Knowledge of deterioration usually is imputed
to an urban landowner because of the intensive use of urban property. Ellickson, supra note
24, at 728; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRm § 839, comment i (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970).
37. For a discussion of plaintiff's extrajudicial remedy of abatement see PROSSER § 90
at 605-06.
38. Baltimore & P.R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317 (1883); Kentucky W. Va.
Gas Co. v. Lafferty, 174 F.2d 848 (6th Cir. 1949); Spaulding v. Cameron, 38 Cal. 2d 265, 239
P.2d 625 (1952); RFSTATEMENT OF ToRTS §§ 929-30 (1939); PROSSER § 90 at 602-03; Ellickson,
supra note 24, at 725-26.
39. Purcell v. Davis, 100 Mont. 480, 50 P.2d 255 (1935); H. MCCLINTOCK, EQurrY §§ 130-
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Endued with broad powers of equity, the court can enjoin the defendant in accordance with the plaintiff's complaint and simultaneously mandate that the plaintiff compensate the defendant for economic loss in relocating or otherwise abating the nuisance. This
latter remedy was adopted in Spur Industries,Inc. v. Del E. Webb
Development Co.," a recent decision in which the plaintiff was required to purchase his injunction. 4' Prevailing doctrine, however,
would deny injunctive relief altogether rather than sell the injunc42
tion.
Despite its longevity and viability, private nuisance law has not
encountered frequently an urban developer bringing his indolent
neighbor to court. This dearth of decisional law is surprising in light
of twentieth century efforts towards urban redevelopment. General
principles of private nuisance law, however, seem to provide in their
abstractions adequate guidance for resolving a suit with such a
novel set of facts. Puritan Holding Co. v. Holloschitz marks one
court's attempt to apply these general principles to the neighborhood conflict of developer versus abandoner.

IV. PuritanHolding Co. AND THE PROBLEM OF LAND USE CONTROL
Although on initial inspection the instant decision might appear a trifling extension of private nuisance law, it heralds serious
consequences in areas of land use control and land development. If
followed as authority for nuisance actions that might arise from the
numerous situations involving urban building abandonments," the
decision could foster wide-spread renovation of inner cities. Relying
on the court's judgment, landowners who want to improve their
parcels and revitalize their neighborhood now more confidently can
work their will. They can force recalcitrant neighbors, who face a
threat of damages in a private nuisance suit, either to improve their
lots or to sell out. Thus private concerns more effectively can take
initiative in promoting localized urban redevelopment in spite of a
lethargic or tightly budgeted public sector. Because of the evils
inherent in urban deterioration, increased redevelopment would
seem desirable. Nevertheless, this result may be less desirable if the
43 (1936); PROSSER § 90 at 603-04; deFuniak, EquitableRelief Against Nuisances, 38 Ky. L.J.
223 (1949-50); Keeton & Morris, Notes on "Balancing the Equities," 18 TFx. L. REv. 412
(1940).
40. 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972).
41. 1973 UTAH L. REv. 55; 26 VAND. L. Rav. 193 (1973); see Ellickson, supra note 24, at
738-48.

42. See 26 VAND. L. Rav. 193, 198 & n.33.
43. See note 11 supra.
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courts unfairly penalize the nonconforming landowner. Even though
he is the misfit, a just result requires that his predicament be afforded more attention than that given in PuritanHolding Co.
On the surface, the instant court properly adhered to existing
doctrine in declaring the abandoned building a private nuisance for
which one remedy was damages;44 New York common law alone
affords ample precedent for such a judgment.4 5 Plaintiff" had suffered substantial harm47 because of defendant's use" of land, a use
that plausibly was unreasonable" in the neighborhood. Although
the court seems correct in labeling the abandonment a private nuisance, its cursory, almost mechanical treatment of the question of
remedies seems inadequate. Any remedy imposed by the court not
only will affect severely the instant parties but also will serve as an
example upon which future legal actions and business judgments
will be based. Thus an award of damages to the prevailing plaintiff
should not be automatic. Depending on the particular circumstances, a more appropriate remedy might be to deny damages, thereby
forcing the plaintiff into equity for injunctive relief. Equitable flexibility then would allow the court latitude to deny the injunction,
issue the injunction cost-free, or issue the injunction contingent
upon the plaintiffs indemnifying the defendant. To approximate
justice, equity, and economy more effectively, choice of a remedy in
private nuisance cases should entail studied consideration by the
court of the greater problem of land use control and development.
Adequate accounting for the problem of land use control and development in turn comprehends consideration of constitutional proscriptions regarding just compensation and analysis of economic
theories concerning efficient land use allocation.
Although the fifth amendment's prohibition against taking private property for public use without just compensation usually re44. See text accompanying note 38 supra. From the tone of the court's opinion, appearance by defendant probably would not have altered the result of the case.
45. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
46. Plaintiffs efforts at neighborhood improvement might be deemed a "coming to the
nuisance" if he knew of defendant's delinquency when he improved his lot. This would not
bar plaintiff's relief, however, unless by making improvements plaintiff transformed his property into a hypersensitive use. See notes 21 & 25 supra and accompanying text.
47. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
48. See notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text.
49. Perhaps intuitively the court weighed the utility of defendant's activity against the
severity of plaintiff's injury in assessing the reasonableness of defendant's use. See notes 2833 supra and accompanying text. Considering the high number of annual abandonments in
New York City and elsewhere, it may be the reasonable, prudent landlord who abandons. In
many situations economic pinch compels abandonment. See Nachbaur, supra note 10, at 1525, 30-50; authorities cited note 11 supra.
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stricts governmental power of eminent domain,- a landowning defendant in a private nuisance action might be able to employ the
just compensation clause to soften the blow of an impending injunction or to defeat plaintiff's claim for damages. Made applicable to
the states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment,5 ' the fifth amendment generally limits only state action; however, the limitations
govern private action when a sufficient nexus exists between the
private concern and the state. This nexus sometimes is found when
the judiciary enforces on behalf of a private party an act inimical
to freedoms protected by the Constitution.2 Assuming that judicial
enforcement provides sufficient state action in a private nuisance
suit, the fifth amendment will operate in the defendant's favor only
if his private property is to be taken for public use. Traditionally,
taking private property has meant condemnation and acquisition by
the state of tangible property, usually land.5 3 Nevertheless, Justice
Holmes and other legal scholars have argued for extending the taking concept to cover intangible property such as rights incidental to
land ownership.54 If extension were granted, the landowner whose
rights to enjoyment were to be infringed by a nuisance injunction
or by an award of damages to the plaintiff could maintain that his
property would be taken without just compensation in violation of
the fifth amendment. The landowner might be successful if his expropriated property were intended for public use. Almost all courts
broadly interpret the public use requirement to denote that private
property be used in furtherance of public welfare, rather than that
the property be used by the public.5 In this vein a landmark New
50. U.S. CONST, amend. V; see Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to PrivateActivity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656 (1974).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
52. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). But cf. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
Judicial enforcement as a means of invoking state action is a problematic, unsettled area
of law. See Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 1083, 1108-20 (1960); Note,
supra note 50.

53.

Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); see F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA,

THE TAKING ISSUE: A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY TO
REGULATE THE USE OF PRIVATELY-OWNED LAND WITHOUT PAYING COMPENSATION TO THE OWNERS

105-38 (1973).
54. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256 (1946); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 415-16 (1922); Ragsale &
Sher, The Court'sRole in the Evolution of Power Over Land, 7 URBAN LAW. 60, 78-79 (1975).
But see United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958). See generally
O'Reilly, The Non-Conforming Use and Due Processof Law, 23 GEo. L.J. 218 (1935); Torts
Symposium-Nuisance-As a "Taking" of Property, 17 U. MIAMI L. REv. 537 (1963).
55. Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L. REv.
615, 626-33 (1940); Special Project-ThePrivate Use of PublicPower: The PrivateUniversity
and the Power of Eminent Domain, 27 VAND. L. REV. 681, 701-05 (1974).
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York case" holds that condemnation for slum clearance is equivalent to taking for public use because the eradication of slums enhances the health, safety, and welfare of the people; that the land
is not used for a public facility subsequent to clearance is inapposite. Private urban redevelopment schemes fostered by the instant
plaintiff and those of similar ilk also enhance the public welfarethe entire community gains by neighborhood improvement-and
arguably could be considered a public use. Therefore, the Constitution might require that a plaintiff compensate justly a neighboring
defendant whose landowning rights are impinged by a nuisance
5
injunction issued in plaintiff's favor.

1

The argument that the plaintiff in a private nuisance action
should be bound by the essentially governmental restrictions contained in the Constitution is tenuous on two counts. First, concomitant with the doctrine of judicial enforcement as a means of invoking state action is the undesirable possibility that all private litigants be controlled by proscriptions intended for the state. 8 Secondly, extension of the taking concept to include infringement of
rights runs afoul of established governmental powers to regulate
without compensating the person regulated.59 Zoning ordinances
provide a prime example of infringement of property rights without
compensation by the government. Another problem with extending
the taking concept concerns defining the point at which a taking
occurs. In light of the broad language of the fourteenth amendment,
one could argue that any deprivation of liberty warrants compensation; carried to its logical conclusion, however, this argument becomes absurd. Despite the weakness of the proposition that the just
compensation clause attaches to private nuisance actions, courts
might further the cause of equity by analogizing to the constitutional prohibition. The purchased injunction remedy imposed in
Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co.,"0 indicates
56.

New York City Housing Auth. v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936).

57. An alternative rationale for requiring that compensation flow from the prevailing
plaintiff to the defendant distinguishes between an injunction that primarily eliminates harm
perpetrated by the defendant and one that primarily benefits the plaintiff; compensation
should be required only in the latter circumstance. Michelman, Toward a PracticalStandard
for Aesthetic Regulation, 15 PRAc. LAw. No. 1, at 36 (1969). Applied to the facts of the instant
case but assuming plaintiff sought an injunction, this rationale probably would result in the
denial of any claim by defendant for compensation because enjoinment of his use would
eliminate a harm and benefit the whole neighborhood, rather than benefit plaintiff only. See
also Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967).
58. See note 52 supra.
59. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
60. See notes 40 & 41 supra and accompanying text.
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that courts might comport better with the demands of fairness by
paralleling the just compensation requirement, especially in situations in which the plaintiff comes to the nuisance.
Economic theories aimed at efficiently resolving problems of
conflicting land uses also should bear on selection of a judicial remedy. Assuming that resources would be allocated more e1i~ciently if
conflicting uses were eliminated, economic theory suggests that the
prevailing use should be the one to which its owner attaches the
higher value.' If A and B are owners of conflicting uses and if A
legally is entitled to his existing use, nevertheless the law should
assign to B the right to undisturbed use of his land if in the marketplace B would have purchased that right from A.12 In other words,
a court should find A's use a private nuisance. Upon such a finding,
remedies available to the court consist of awarding the plaintiff
damages, awarding the plaintiff injunctive relief, and awarding an
injunction only if the plaintiff compensates the defendant. 3 An
award of damages carries the desirable effect of determinating the
value of the right transferred; if left to the marketplace to negotiate
valuation, the parties might incur costs that exceed litigation expense because of one party's stubbornness or unreasonable subjectivity. Excess negotiation costs more productively could be expended elsewhere." Moreover, by fixing valuation the court will
force the defendant to engage in a cost-benefit analysis whether to
pay future damages65 or adopt measures to abate the nuisance."
Assuming that the defendant is a rational economic being, he will
adopt the cheaper alternative, which presumably is the more beneficial to society. If the plaintiff subjectively determines that an injunction is worth more to him than the amount of damages recoverable, he will try to enjoin the defendant's use. The court seeking
efficiency should grant injunctive relief only in situations in which
the defendant's costs in eliminating the nuisance are perceived to
be less than the benefit to be derived by the plaintiff. 7 This balanc61. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10-13 (1972) [hereinafter cited as POSNER].
Wealth distribution preferences also affect assignment of property rights. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1097-101 (1972).
62. POSNER 18.
63. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 61, at 1115-16; Ellickson, supra note 24, at
738-48.
64. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 61, at 1106; Ellickson, supra note 24, at 739.
65. A continuing nuisance might subject the defendant to periodic liability for damages
to the plaintiff who periodically sues. See authorities cited at note 38 supra.
67. POSNER 29; Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 61 at 1118; Ellickson, supra note 24,
at 743.
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ing test, however, entails judicial expense and promotes uncertainty
in the resolution process."5 For these reasons the purchased injunction remedy might be preferable because it would deter the plaintiff
at the outset from pursuing an inefficient injunction; the plaintiff
presumably will refuse to pay the defendant an amount greater than
the benefits expected from the injunction. Thus the purchased injunction remedy might mitigate litigation expense. If the plaintiff
pursues a remedy in a judicial forum, however, the purchased injunction remedy further can lend itself to a more economically efficient solution than a straight cost-free injunction. Assume that the
defendant will receive compensation only if and to the extent that
the benefits he derives from the nuisance activity exceed the costs
that the activity inflicts upon neighbors. If the defendant's benefits
are greater that his neighbors' costs, the defendant should receive
compensation to the extent of the lesser of his expense in relocating
or in curtailing the nuisance activity. If the defendant's benefits are
less than his neighbors' costs, he should receive no compensation. 9
Thus the purchased injunction remedy, by its responsiveness to
varying factual situations, can promote resolution of conflicting
neighborhood uses more expediently than can the straight injunction remedy. The use or set of uses perceived to be more efficient
prevails under the purchased injunction remedy, but not without
allowance of the costs, if any, to the owner of the preempted use.
The foregoing discussion regarding economic efficiency merely
delineates possible shortcomings in mechanically imposing a private nuisance remedy. Because fairness dictates that protection
consistently be afforded the landowner who reasonably uses his
land, application of economic theories alone cannot supply the ultimate solution. Nevertheless, potential exists in nuisance law for an
active interplay between law and economics.70 Although in the short
68. Ellickson, supra note 24, at 739.
69. Ellickson, supra note 24, at 738-48. For a discussion of economic and practical
problems of employing the purchased injunction remedy in class actions see Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 61, at 1116-17.
In cases in which the plaintiff moves to the nuisance, a purchased injunction might
provide the most economic remedy in terms of locational choice. If a landowner wants to
develop a use incompatible with a preexisting neighoring use and if the landowner knows that
he might have to compensate his neighbor for relocating or for ceasing operations, he will
choose to carry out his plans only if that is the cheaper alternative to him and thus to society.
If he can locate in an area devoid of incompatible uses with less expense, the developer will
do so. Placing a price on the injunction thereby appears to foster efficient land use allocation.
Note, An Economic Analysis of Land Use Conflicts, 21 STAN. L. Rxv. 293, 303-09 (1969).
70. See POSNER; Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 61; Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcoN. 1 (1960); Demsetz, Toward a Theory of PropertyRights, 57 AM. EcoN.
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run the costs of supplementing jurisprudence with the science of
economics might appear high, these costs seem trifling if in the long
run conflict resolution processes can be enhanced to promote a more
efficient land use allocation.
That nuisance remedies can be employed by an enlightened
court to reach an equitable and economic resolution does not foreclose manipulation of nuisance law to the undue advantage of land
developers. A wealthy developer might move into an area, improve
the majority of it in order to set the neighborhood character, and
then rid himself of any proximate incompatible uses by private
nuisance actions. Under the purchased injunction theory, which
provides the most equitable remedy from the defendant's position,
the developer will have to pay his way, but in effect nuisance law
will have bestowed upon the private developer with adequate capital use of the public power of eminent domain. Even if the developer
chooses to seek damages, he still might be able to force his way on
a recalcitrant neighbor almost as effectively as by injunction. For
example, inability or unwillingness of the defendant to pay the judgment debt will allow the developer to levy upon the defendant's land
and purchase it at an execution sale, subject to the claims of mortgagees and other lien creditors. Alternatively, the two parties might
negotiate a settlement whereby the defendant complies with the
developer's wishes in exchange for cancellation of the judgment
debt.7 To prevent usurpation of power by the land developer, courts
must be sensitive to the demands of fairness. Considerations of
fairness underlie application of nuisance law because the trier of
fact must weigh the relative merits of plaintiffs and defendant's
situations. Although formulas have been devised to objectify this
balancing process, visceral reactions of the fact finder always will
play a large part in determining whether harm to the plaintiff is
substantial and whether land use by the defendant is reasonable.
Thus subjectivity of a third party can check a land developer's
scheme and shield a defendant whose use patently was reasonable
before the arrival of the developer. An additional check arises if the
plaintiff seeks injunctive relief; then equity will compel another
balancing of interests before the defendant's rights are infringed.
V.

CONCLUSION

When conscientiously and prudently applied, nuisance law can
REv. 347 (1967) (Vol. 2-Papers and Proceedings); Ellickson, supra note 24. See generally E.
MISHAM,

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

101-37 (1971).

71. See Ellickson, supra note 24, at 741-42.
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be an expedient means of land use control.7 2 Although zoning ordinances historically have provided the means by which cities have
controlled use of the land they encompassed, zoning is adaptable
primarily to pervasive problems of land management. More localized problems should be assigned to the realm of nuisance law because of the flexibility" inherent in applying nuisance doctrine.
What is an unreasonable and intolerable use of urban land varies
with the vicissitudes of time, and nuisance law adequately allows
for change to be reflected in its balancing process. Unless courts are
willing to study diligently each new case, however, the efficacy of
nuisance doctrine will be vitiated. Only a deliberate application of
existing law can harmonize discordant land uses in the neighborhood while furthering justice. Moreover, just resolution of the conflict can be enhanced by economic analysis of private nuisance remedies in an effort to avoid waste.
DAVID G. RUSSELL

Administrative Law-Federal Trade Commission
Act-Consumer Private Right of Action
Recognized Under Section 5
I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Plaintiff consumers brought a class action in federal district
court' for damages and injunctive relief alleging that defendant retailer had engaged in unfair and deceptive acts or practices in commerce in violation of section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA).' The practices of which plaintiffs complained were
72. Beuscher & Morrison, JudicialZoning Through Recent Nuisance Cases, 1955 Wis.
L. Ray. 440; Ellickson, supra note 24; Comment, supra note 13.
73. Concomitant with the advantage of being flexible, nuisance law as a means of land
use control carries the disadvantages of being unstable and unpredictable. If nuisance law
remains unsettled, incentives to invest in neighborhoods containing an incompatible use will
be impaired. PosNaR 20-21.

1. Subject matter jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970), which provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding
arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and comnerce against restraints and monopolies.
Federal jurisdiction is thus obtained irrespective of either the amount in controversy or the
citizenship of the parties.
2. As recently amended by the Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act
(Magnuson-Moss Warranty), § 5(a)(1) provides, "Unfair methods of competition in corn-

1078

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:1077

the subject of a consent order,' allegedly applicable to defendant,4
entered by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 1963. Defendant argued that because the Act contains no provision for private
enforcement, the FTC alone is authorized to enforce the broad proscriptions of the FTCA. Plaintiff contended that an implied private
right of action is necessary to supplement the Commission's enforcemerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared
unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974). The amendment added the words "or
affecting."
3. The order provides in part as follows:
It is ordered,That respondent Rich Plan Corporation, a corporation, and its officers
and respondents' agents, representatives and employees, directly or through any
corporate or other device, in connection with the offering for sale, sale or distribution of
freezers, food or freezer-food plans . . . do forthwith cease and desist from:
1. Representing directly or by implication that:
a. Purchasers of the freezer-food plan will receive the same amount of
food and a freezer for the same or less money than the purchasers have
been paying for food alone.
4. Inducing individuals to sign any negotiable instrument in connection
with a freezer or food plan if said instrument is to be sold to a finance company
or other commercial institution unless it is clearly and conspicuously stated on
the face of said instrument that it is to be sold to a finance company or other
commercial institution and that the payer or payers thereof will be obligated to
make full payment on said instrument without regard to any personal defense
that said payer or payers could assert against respondents.
In re Rich Plan Corp., 63 F.T.C. 1099, 1104-05 (1963).
An FTC consent order is the product of a nonadjudicative proceeding which commences
with notification of a person or company by the Commission of its intention to issue a
complaint charging a violation of the law. Within 10 days the person or company may then
agree to have the proceeding disposed of by executing with the FTC an agreement containing
a consent order to cease and desist. While as a matter of course the consent order stipulates
that the signing of the agreement "is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an
admission by respondents that the law has been violated," it has the same force with respect
to compliance as a cease and desist order produced by a more formal adjudicative proceeding.
The latter requires a full-blown agency hearing before an administrative law judge.
4. Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that defendant Rich Plan of The Midwest was
operated as a franchise of Rich Plan Corporation, the concern against which the FTC's order
was specifically entered. If the allegation is true, the order would seem clearly to be applicable
to defendant.
Joined with Rich Plan as defendants were three individuals. While plaintiffs seek to hold
them liable on other theories, they apparently ask no recovery from defendant natural persons
based upon a private action under the FTCA. This is presumably the result of considerable
doubt that the 1963 consent decree is applicable to them.
In addition to their claim under the FTCA, plaintiffs alleged violations of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1970), the
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970), and the Indiana Deceptive Sales Practices
Act, IND. STATS. ANN. § 26-1-2-313 (1974). Plaintiffs further charged common law fraud and
misrepresentation. The instant court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the antitrust and
securities law counts, but assumed jurisdiction over the claims based upon the Truth in
Lending Act and state and common law.
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ment activities and thus to effectuate the purpose of the Act to
protect consumers from fraudulent business practices. On defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted,5 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana held, motion denied. When the Federal
Trade Commission has ruled that a business enterprise has engaged
in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of section 5(a) (1)
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, a consumer's complaint alleging injury by the acts or practices states a cause of action.
Guernsey v. Rich Plan of The Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind.
1976).
I1.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

In 1914 Congress enacted the Clayton6 and Federal Trade Commission 7 Acts to supplement the antitrust provisions of the Sherman
Act.' In contrast to the relatively specific prohibitions of the Clayton
Act,' section 5 of the FTCA declared unlawful "unfair methods of
competition in commerce."'" The FTCA's broad and flexible language was designed to prevent circumvention of the Clayton Act's
specific prohibitions and to reach potentially anticompetitive business schemes in their incipiency." In further contrast to the Clayton
Act and its wide range of enforcement devices, including private
actions for treble damages,"2 the FTCA established and committed
its enforcement to the FTC.' 3 By the 1914 Act Congress authorized
the FTC, upon finding a violation of section 5, to issue a cease and
desist order against the offending person, partnership, or corporation. 4 Subsequent amendments to the Act have expanded significantly both the scope of the section 5 prohibition and the FTC's
enforcement powers. The Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938's amended section 5 of the FTCA to declare unlawful "unfair or deceptive acts or
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
6. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1970).
7. Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1970).
8. Ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
9. The Clayton Act prohibits, inter alia, price discrimination, tie-in sales, anticompetitive stock acquisitions, and interlocking directorates. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970).
10. Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
11. See G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMM(SSION (1924).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
13. Section 5, Ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970), provides in part: "The
commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition in commerce."
14. Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 720 (1914).
15. Ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (1938).
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practices in commerce"' 6 in addition to "unfair methods of competi-

tion." The effect of the amendment was to overrule legislatively the
case of FTC v. Raladam Co.,' 7 in which the Supreme Court, narrowly construing "methods of competition," held that the FTC had
no power to issue an order when an unfair practice injured only
consumers and not competitors.'" By the 1938 amendment, therefore, Congress clearly extended the jurisdiction of the FTC to protect consumers from fraud.'9 The most significant expansion of the
FTC's enforcement powers came in the most recent amendment, 2
which authorizes the FTC, under certain circumstances, to bring an
action in either state or federal court to secure redress for injured
2
consumers. '
16. Id.
17. 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
18. Id. at 652-54.
19. By the proposed amendment to § 5, the Commission can prevent such acts or
practices which injuriously affect the general public as well as those which are unfair to
competitors. In other words, this amendment makes the consumer, who may be injured
by an unfair trade practice, of equal concern, before the law, with the merchant or
manufacturer injured by the unfair methods of a dishonest competitor.
H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
20. Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (Magnuson-Moss Warranty), 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
21. Section 17b of the FTCA, 15 U.S.C. § 57b (Supp. IV, 1974), now provides in part
as follows:

(a)...
(1) If any person, partnership, or corporation violates any rule under this
chapter respecting unfair or deceptive acts or practices (other than an interpretive rule, or a rule violation of which the Commission has provided is not an
unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of section 45(a) of this title), then
the Commission may commence a civil action against such person, partnership,
or corporation for relief under subsection (b) of this section in a United States
district court or in any court of competent jurisdiction of a State.
(2) If any person, partnership, or corporation engages in any unfair or
deceptive act or practice (within the meaning of Section 45(a)(1) of this title)
with respect to which the Commission has issued a final cease and desist order
which is applicable to such person, partnership, or corporation, then the Commission may commence a civil action against such person, partnership, or corporation in a United States district court or in any court of competent jurisdiction
of a State. If the Commission satisfies the court that the act or practice to which
the cease and desist order relates is one which a reasonable man would have
known under the circumstances was dishonest or fraudulent, the court may
grant relief under subsection (b) of this section.

(b)...
The court in any action under subsection (a) of this section shall have jurisdiction
to grant such relief as the court finds necessary to redress injury to consumers or other
persons, partnerships, and corporations resulting from the rule violation or the unfair or
deceptive act or practice . . ..
The amendment also significantly expands the FTC's authority to enforce civil penalties.
The Commission now may bring an action for violation of a rule promulgated by it upon a
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The cases in which private parties have sought to assert a right
of action under section 5 of the FTCA fall into two groups readily
distinguishable on the basis of the nature of the plaintiff. The first
group of plaintiffs involves business competitors of the defendant.
Thus, in Atlanta Brick Co. v. O'Nea12 plaintiff, a brick manufacturer, alleged that defendant, a competing manufacturer, had misrepresented the quality of plaintiff's product and thereby had
caused it to be rejected by architects on several projects. Plaintiff
sought recovery under the FTCA or, in the alternative, treble damages for defendant's alleged violation of the antitrust laws. Reasoning that the purpose of section 5's broad language was to strengthen
the power of the FTC, the O'Neal court held that the FTCA grants
no private right of action to a person injured in his business by
unfair trade practices.2 3 Another district court reached the same
result in Samson Crane Co. v. Union National Sales, Inc.,24 citing
as authority a case in which the Supreme Court summarily rejected
an attempt to allege "unfair methods of competition" in an anti28
trust complaint. 25 All other decisions in this group are in accord.
The second group of cases in which private parties have sought
to establish a right of action under the FTCA involves consumers
as plaintiffs. In the leading case, Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp.,27
plaintiff consumers brought a class action alleging that defendant
had engaged in false advertising in violation of sections 5(a)(1) and
12(a) (1)28 of the Act. Concluding from an examination of the Act
showing of "actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances" that an act or practice engaged in is unfair or deceptive and prohibited by the rule.
In addition, with respect to an act or practice concerning which a final cease and desist order
has been entered, the FTC may bring a civil penalty action against anyone who engages in
the practice with actual knowledge that the practice was unfair or deceptive and unlawful.
The penalty is $10,000 for each violation or, in the case of a continuing violation, $10,000 per
day. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (Supp. IV, 1974).
22. 44 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Tex. 1942).
23. Id. at 42.
24. 87 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass. 1949).
25. Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926). Without discussion, the
Court stated: "There is an attempt to allege unfair methods of competition, which may be
put aside at once, since relief in such cases under the Trade Commission Act must be afforded
in the first instance by the commission." Id. at 603.
26. See, e.g., La Salle St. Press, Inc. v. McCormick & Henderson, Inc., 293 F. Supp.
1004 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 302
(N.D. 111. 1965); National Fruit Prod. Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499 (D. Mass.
1942).
27. 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
28. Section 12(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 52(a)(1) (1970) provides as follows:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation to disseminate,
or cause to be disseminated, any false advertisement-
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and its legislative history that Congress intended to make the administrative program of enforcement an exclusive one, the Holloway
court held that consumers have no right of action under the FTCA.2 '
The court reasoned that the FTC's expertise and discretion in the
use of its flexible enforcement powers are fundamental to the careful
legislative balance of consumer and business interests. Private lawsuits, the court asserted, would disrupt the FTC's coordinated enforcement activities and therefore upset that balance." In addition,
pointing to the distinctive functions of the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the FTC,' the Holloway court distinguished J..
Case Co. v. Borak,32 in which the Supreme Court held that private
parties have a right to bring suit for violation of the proxy solicitation rules promulgated by the SEC.33 The only other reported
cases in which consumers have sought a private remedy under the
FTCA are in accord.3 4 Prior to the instant decision, therefore, the
courts consistently refused to recognize a private right of action, by
either business competitors or consumers, under section 5 of the
FTCA.

III.

THE INSTANT OPINION

The instant court initially enumerated two requisites for finding an implied private right of action under a federal regulatory
statute. First, the statute must have been designed to protect a class
of persons of which plaintiffs are members from the harm of which
they complain. Secondly, a private civil remedy must be consistent
with the purposes of the statute. Assuming without direct discussion
that the first requisite was met, the instant court then recognized
(1) By United States mails, or in commerce by any means, for the purpose
of inducing, or which is likely to induce, directly or indirectly the purchase of
food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics ....
Section 12(b) declares such false advertising to be an unfair or deceptive act or practice within
the meaning of § 45.
29. 485 F.2d at 987-88.
30. Id. at 997-99.
31. The court stated:
The SEC is primarily a clearance agency, and once its clearance responsibilities
have been carried out and the proxy statement, registration statement, or the like has
been permitted to become effective, there is little danger that an intervening private suit
will derail the Commission's ongoing administrative processes. In the case of the Trade
Commission, the corporation's dissemination of materials represents not the end of a
(clearance) proceeding but the beginning of administrative scrutiny and a potential
enforcement problem.
Id. at 1001.
32. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
33. Id. at 430-31.
34. Bott v. Holiday Universal, Inc., 45 U.S.L.W. 2071 (U.S. July 14, 1976); Carlson v.
Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973).
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that federal courts historically have refused to recognize a private
right of action under the FTCA. Thus addressing the requirement
that private enforcement be consistent with the purpose of the
FTCA, the court asserted that because the FTC has been ineffective
in protecting consumers from ongoing fraud,3 5 the Act as enforced
by the Commission is "an empty promise to consumers."3 6 The
court therefore determined that an implied private right of action
was necessary to effectuate the purposes of the FTCA. The court
then distinguished Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp.31 as presenting
a factual context significantly different from that of the instant
case. While the FTC had taken no action with respect to the acts
or practices at issue in Holloway, the court emphasized, the Commission had examined the practices alleged by plaintiffs in the instant case and, in a consent order applicable to defendant, had ruled
them violative of the statute. The court maintained that when, as
in the instant case, the FTC has ruled on the acts or practices
involved, the argument commonly advanced against private enforcement of the FTCA-that the FTC, "with its overview of the
national economy, is in a better position than a private litigant to
gauge the injury a deceptive practice will cause the public and to
balance this against the likely cost of elimination of the practice" 38-is without force. The court therefore held that plaintiff consumers' complaint, alleging violations of section 5(a)(1) of the
FTCA, stated a cause of action.
IV.

COMMENT

The precise scope of the instant court's decision, the first to
recognize an implied private right of action under the FTCA, is not
entirely clear. Certainly one limitation on the scope is that the FTC
must have ruled on, and found violative of the statute, the acts or
practices of which the plaintiff complains. Most narrowly construed, the instant decision would require in addition: (1) that the
FTC's determination be in the form of a cease and desist order; (2)
that the order be applicable to the defendant; and (3) that the
plaintiff's injury result from a violation of the order, rather than
35. The court noted that the FTC is able to investigate only 1 out of 8 or 9 of the 9,000
complaints it receives each year. Moreover, the court stated, even in those cases, roughly 1
out of 10, in which an investigation results in the issuance of a cease and desist order, the
extent to which consumers are thereby protected is suspect. Guernsey v. Rich Plan of The
Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582, 586 (1976).

36. Id. at 587.
37.
38.

See notes 27-32 supra and accompanying text.
408 F. Supp. at 588.
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from the defendant's acts or practices that antedate issuance of the
order. The court's rationale, however, seems to countenance a
broader right of action. If, as the court asserts, the primary impediment to private enforcement of the FTCA is that properly the FTC
should determine which acts or practices require elimination,39 then
none of these three limitations logically follows. Rather, from this
conception of the impediment it would seem to follow that as long
as the FTC has made a definitive determination with respect to a
particular act or practice, whether by way of a cease and desist order
entered or a rule promulgated by the Commission, a private action
for damages would be maintainable by a consumer against any
business enterprise that had engaged in the act or practice. Given
this broader interpretation the instant decision raises problems not
considered by the court concerning the standard of liability to be
applied. When determining the standard of liability, however, a
court presumably would look for guidance to the recently enacted
amendment to the FTCA.4 Thus, with reference to the amendment,
a court might hold a defendant liable to a consumer for violation of
a rule promulgated by the FTC upon a showing of actual or implied
knowledge that the act or practice was unfair or deceptive and prohibited by the rule. It is noteworthy, however, that the FTCA authorizes the FTC to seek redress for injury to consumers resulting
from acts or practices declared unlawful by a cease and desist order
only against a person, partnership, or corporation subject to the
order.4 While the court's reasoning, therefore, seems to recognize a
private right of action broader in scope than the FTC's authority to
seek redress for consumers, it is questionable whether the instant
court actually would go so far.
Whatever its scope, the instant decision may be viewed as an
attempt to strike a reasonable compromise between the FTC's role
in the enforcement of the FTCA and effective consumer protection
at the federal level of government. By limiting the private remedy
to cases in which the Commission already has ruled violative of the
statute the acts or practices of which the plaintiff complains, the
instant court has avoided the most obvious problem otherwise presented by private actions under the FTCA. As limited by the court,
private enforcement would not conflict with the FTC's authority to
define, through adjudication and rulemaking, the contours of the
broad statutory proscription. In short, the instant decision is desira39.
40.
41.

See text accompanying notes 37 & 38 supra.
See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
Id.
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ble to the extent that it does not call upon federal courts to fashion
a federal common law of consumer fraud. Nonetheless, other problems with respect to interference with the FTC's role remain.
Limiting the implied private right of action to cases in which
the FTC has ruled on the practices involved, the instant court
clearly recognized that the FTC's expert judgment and inherent
agency discretion in defining "unfair or deceptive acts or practices"
are central to the statutory framework. The court failed to recognize, however, that the Commission's expertise and discretion are
no less applicable to the exercise of its enforcement powers: the
statutory scheme clearly comprehends that administrative flexibility will be brought to bear both in defining violations and in dealing
with violators. With the FTC's flexibility in the latter regard,
equally central to the FTCA, even limited private enforcement is
inconsistent. Moreover, private enforcement may well cause a loss
of whatever effectiveness the Commission now can claim in securing
compliance with the Act through nonadjudicative proceedings42 because under the instant court's rationale, entering into a consent
agreement with the FTC would seem tantamount to inviting a lawsuit.
The FTC has been the target of severe criticism in recent years
for its ineffectiveness in the area of consumer protection.43 Largely
as a result of this criticism and of an increased national awareness
of the need for more effective protection of consumer interests, a
number of proposed amendments to the FTCA have been submitted
to Congress. While, interestingly, one proposal expressly would have
authorized treble damage actions by consumers for violations of
section 5,44 the congressional response was more consistent with a
scheme to which administrative flexibility is central. 5 Thus, although the result reached in the instant case is an intuitively attractive one, it is inconsistent with a deliberate, if somewhat less than
wholly effective, legislative design for the protection of consumers.
THOMAS

J. HARTLAND, JR.

42. See note 3 supra.
43. See E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ, "THE NADER REPORT" ON THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (1969); ABA COMM. ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT (1969).
44. S. 1823, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The amendment was introduced by Sen. Hart.
45. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
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